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ESSAY 
HOW ITALIAN COLORS GUTS PRIVATE 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BY REPLACING IT 
WITH INEFFECTIVE FORMS OF ARBITRATIONµ 
Einer Elhauge* 
The United States is becoming more like Europe, and not in a 
good way. For a long time, the central difference between antitrust 
enforcement in the United States and Europe has been that the United 
States features not only public enforcement, but a vigorous system of 
private antitrust enforcement, while in Europe, public agencies have 
had an effective monopoly on antitrust enforcement. But that 
difference is on the verge of collapsing. We are achieving a form of 
convergence; but contrary to expectations, this convergence is not 
coming from recent European efforts to facilitate private enforcement, 
which have not yet overcome some serious obstacles on discovery 
and class actions. Instead, it is coming from the recent US Supreme 
Court decision in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,1 
which threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the United 
States by replacing it with ineffective forms of arbitration. 
Procedural differences explain the prior divergence between the 
United States and Europe on private antitrust enforcement. After all, 
private claims for violations of European competition law can and 
have been brought, so it is not as if European law bans private 
antitrust suits. However, limited discovery and the lack of class action 
suits have generally meant that private suits are usually infeasible in 
Europe. After all, nowadays you generally cannot prove antitrust 
damages without proving market definition, market power, and the 
economic effects of the conduct. Proving those elements requires 
market data and economic experts to analyze it. But without 
discovery, a private plaintiff cannot obtain the necessary data, and 
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1. See Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) [hereinafter Italian 
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without class action mechanisms, a disparate group of market 
participants cannot fund the expensive expert reports necessary to 
analyze it. Thus, in Europe, the field of antitrust enforcement has 
largely been left to public enforcers. The new EU Directive on 
antitrust damages encourages European nations to provide more 
private discovery and to allow at least opt-in class actions, but the 
Directive does not yet mandate clear rules to solve these problems.2  
Historically matters have been quite different in the United 
States, which also effectively requires market data and economic 
experts to prove antitrust damages, but instead allows liberal 
discovery to collect that market data and class actions to fund the 
economic experts. Or at least that was the law before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Italian Colors. In that case, the Supreme Court 
considered “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is 
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost 
of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the 
potential recovery.”3 As Justice Kagan observed in dissent, “No 
rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars 
if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”4 
Accordingly, Justice Kagan and the Second Circuit concluded that the 
contract provision waiving class arbitration fell afoul of the rule that 
arbitration provisions should not be enforced when they prevent the 
“effective vindication” of federal law.5 
How, then, did the Supreme Court justify its conclusion that the 
effective vindication of antitrust law was not thwarted by a provision 
that required plaintiffs to proceed in an individual way that meant 
costs would be at least ten times the possible recovery if the plaintiff 
won? Its analysis boiled down to one thin paragraph, with two thinner 
reasons. 
First, in an effort to distinguish prior cases holding that 
arbitration clauses could neither waive a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies nor impose arbitration fees that were too large to 
make access practicable, the Supreme Court argued that those cases 
involved the ability or expense necessary to “pursue” the statutory 
                                                            
2. Council Directive No. 0089/2014 (Sept. 4, 2014) on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union. 2014 O.J. L 349/1. 
3. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
4. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
5. See id. at 2313-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting); In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 
300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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remedy, rather than “the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy.”6 As the dissent pointed out, this amounted to simply saying 
that the prior cases involved different facts; the whole point of having 
a principle like “effective vindication” is that enforceability can be 
gutted in a myriad of ways, so we need a general principle to deal 
with all the variations.7 More fundamentally, there simply is no 
meaningful difference between the right to pursue a claim and the 
right to prove it, given that pursuing a claim necessarily requires 
proving it to win. It is rather like saying you have the right to be 
represented at trial by counsel, as long as your counsel does not 
speak. 
Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 1890 and 1914 
Congresses that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts could not 
possibly have thought that class action procedure was necessary to 
effectively vindicate federal antitrust rights because those Acts were 
enacted decades before federal class actions were made possible by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.8 But the Court failed to grapple 
with the simple fact that back then plaintiffs could and usually did 
prove antitrust violations and damages without any economic rigor 
and thus did not need an economics expert. That made individual low-
stakes antitrust suits far more possible. Now that the courts have 
interpreted federal antitrust law to require an economically rigorous 
showing on market definition, power, and effects, antitrust claims 
require an economics expert, precluding individual low-stakes suits 
and thus requiring some sort of class procedure to share the costs. 
The Court conceded that “the effective-vindication rule asks 
about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when 
Congress passed a given statute,” but the Court reasoned that “time 
does not change the meaning of effectiveness, making ineffective 
vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”9 
However, this reasoning is simply not responsive because the point is 
that changes in the world require economic expert testimony to prove 
a claim now but not then. This change demonstrates that under a 
constant meaning of effectiveness, a procedure that does not allow 
expert testimony makes vindication ineffective now, even though it 
would not have made it ineffective back then when no expert 
                                                            
6. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
7. Id. at 2317–18 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
8. Id. at 2311. 
9. Id. at 2311 n.4.  
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testimony was required to prove a claim. To put it another way, the 
Congress that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts intended to 
create a right of private antitrust enforcement. That Congress might 
have thought that right would be vindicated without class actions back 
when little proof was required, and that Congress might have thought 
that right could be vindicated when the courts required additional 
expensive proof as long as class procedures that allowed that proof to 
be funded. But that Congress could not have thought that right would 
be vindicated if the courts both required additional expensive proof 
and disallowed any class procedures necessary to fund it. 
Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion actually offered a more 
coherent rationale: that plaintiff’s voluntary consent to the arbitration 
provision required enforcing that provision even if waived effective 
or even literal enforcement of a statutory right.10 This consent 
rationale raises an important challenge that I think explains a lot about 
the Court’s whole attitude to arbitration clauses. If customers 
voluntarily consent to an arbitration provision that guts an 
enforcement right, can’t we conclude that those customers must have 
thought that the enforcement right was worth less than whatever they 
got in return in the contract negotiation? Wouldn’t preventing 
enforcement of such provisions thus make customers worse off? 
To address this challenge, it is best to begin by asking ourselves 
a foundational question: why do we have antitrust laws at all? After 
all, virtually all antitrust violations require the consent of the 
defendant’s customers. If defendants enter into a cartel or merger that 
raises prices, buyers could in theory defeat it by refusing to pay any 
increase in prices. The cartel or merger works only because buyers 
instead consent to those prices. If a monopolist uses predatory pricing, 
tying, exclusive dealing, or other exclusionary conduct to exclude its 
rivals and raise prices to consumers, those consumers could in theory 
defeat the conduct by refusing to accept the predatorily-priced good, 
the tying condition, or any other exclusive or exclusionary condition. 
Exclusionary conduct works only if buyers consent to it. Thus, the 
consent logic wrongly implies that all antitrust violations must benefit 
the buyers who agree to them, precisely contrary to the purpose of 
antitrust law, which is to protect consumer welfare. 
The flaw in this consent logic is that buyers in markets have a 
collective action problem. If buyers acted together, then they would 
                                                            
10. Id. at 2312–13 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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refuse to consent to conduct that harms them all. But acting 
individually, each buyer has incentives to agree to inflated prices or 
exclusionary conditions because they know that in a market with 
many buyers, no individual buyer’s refusal to consent will affect the 
market result, but an individual refusal to consent will affect whether 
that buyer gets the good the buyer desires.11 The whole reason we 
have antitrust laws is to provide a collective action solution, via 
statute, to our collective action problem. 
The same problem infects consents to arbitration clauses that 
waive the right to effective vindication of antitrust law. If buyers 
acted together, then they would only consent if those waivers made 
them better off. But acting individually, each buyer has incentives to 
consent in exchange for a trivial discount from the inflated market-
wide prices that will result when all buyers consent to effectively 
immunizing antitrust violations against them. It takes only a trivial 
discount because each buyer knows that their individual decision 
whether to consent has little effect on whether the market-wide harm 
from immunizing antitrust violations occurs.  
To put it another way, competitive markets are a public good, 
from which each buyer in a market benefits, whether or not that buyer 
contributes to the creation of that public good by rejecting conduct or 
agreements that keep that market competitive. Thus, buyers inevitably 
have incentives not to contribute; instead they will predictably 
consent to conduct and arbitration waivers that result in 
uncompetitive markets. 
The future implications are alarming. Given the Italian Colors 
decision, it is hard to see why all businesses would not at least insert 
arbitration clauses into their contracts that preclude class arbitration. 
Given the limited nature of discovery in arbitration, that alone will 
bring US private enforcement largely into convergence with Europe, 
and perhaps will leave US private enforcement even less effective 
than the European Union in the future if the new EU directive leads to 
stronger national rules on discovery and class actions.  
Businesses are likely to go even further given the Supreme 
Court’s logic that arbitration provisions are permissible whenever 
                                                            
11. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 456–57 (2009) (detailing this issue for the 
sort of tying claim considered in the Italian Colors case); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better 
Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 284–92 (2003) (detailing it for other 
exclusionary conduct).   
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they eliminate only the right to prove a claim, rather than the right to 
pursue it. Under this logic, parties could adopt arbitration provisions 
eliminating the ability to introduce economic expert testimony 
altogether, even though that would effectively preclude not only class 
suits but also suits by corporate plaintiffs that might have large 
enough stakes to fund an expert. The Court offered two responses to 
this possibility. First, it said, “it is not a given that such a clause 
would constitute an impermissible waiver,”12 which alarmingly 
suggests this possibility might well be in our future. Second, the 
Court said that this possibility would be different because “such a 
clause, assuming it makes vindication of the claim impossible, makes 
it impossible not just as a class action but even as an individual 
claim.”13 But that rationale conflicts with the Court’s logic that the 
difference is between being able to pursue a claim and prove it, and 
disturbingly suggests the Court is resting instead on a hostility to class 
actions over corporate suits. 
Moreover, the Court’s logic would also seem to permit many 
other possible ways of gutting antitrust enforcement that the Court did 
not address. Parties could adopt provisions that preclude discovery 
even more than it is already limited in arbitration, say by barring any 
discovery into market definition, power, or anticompetitive effects. 
Indeed, the Court’s distinction between barring proof versus barring 
pursuit of a claim would even suggest that arbitration clauses could 
baldly prohibit offering any proof in arbitration on market definition, 
power, or anticompetitive effects, because that would go simply to the 
right to prove the claim. This would leave private enforcement by US 
buyers even less effective than in Europe. 
This development would immunize businesses against US 
federal antitrust enforcement by anyone who contracts with them, 
which is almost any private party who can sue given that federal 
antitrust law largely limits antitrust enforcement to direct purchasers. 
The main exception would be antitrust suits by rivals excluded by 
exclusionary conduct, who may have no contract with the defendant 
and thus no arbitration provision. But that is hardly an adequate 
substitute because:  
[A]ny rival claim will be limited to the competitive profits the 
rival could have earned on some share of the market in the but-
                                                            
12. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 n.3. 
13. Id. 
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for world. A monopolist will generally find it profitable to pay 
such low competitive profits on a smaller market share out of the 
monopoly profits it gains on its monopoly market share.14  
Further, “it is too easy to cut side deals with rivals through 
settlements that may satisfy the financial interests of the rivals but fail 
to fix (or even worsen) the anticompetitive problem.”15 Indeed, the 
Italian Colors decision creates incentives for them to cut side deals 
that include arbitration provisions that bar effective antitrust 
enforcement between them. And given that the Italian Colors 
decision allows each business to use arbitration clauses that 
effectively immunize them against their buyers, businesses might not 
have much incentive to even try to exclude each other since it is more 
profitable to instead collude and jointly exploit their buyers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement As an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 85 
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15. Id. 
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